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Abstract
The present study is the second is a series of three papers devoted to issues in the
measurement of productivity and productivity growth. The contributions of the
present paper are three. First, it introduces a new approach to measuring industrial
productivity based on income-side data that are published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). The data are internally consistent in that both inputs and outputs are
income-side measures of value added, whereas the usual productivity measures
combine expenditure-side output measures with income-side input measures.
Second, because of interest in the “new economy,” we have also constructed a set of
new-economy accounts. For the purpose of this study, we define the new economy
as machinery, electric equipment, telephone and telegraph, and software. Finally,
because of concerns about poor deflation in the current output measures, this study
constructs a new output concept called “well-measured output,” which includes only
those sectors for which output is relatively well measured. We present a brief
summary of the behavior of the alternative measures.

I. Introduction and Summary
Productivity measurement has itself enjoyed significant productivity advances over the last
half century. Among the major advances are improvements in data, development of new methods
(particularly improved techniques in measuring price and output indexes), and the availability of
friendly software and powerful computers to construct new measures and analyze the data.
Among the more interesting new possibilities is the use of disaggregated data on productivity.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis makes data available on output, inputs, compensation, and prices
for approximately 80 one-digit and two-digit industries. For unexplained reasons, BEA does not,
however, provide productivity statistics that correspond to its income-side input and output data.
The present paper is the second in a trilogy of papers analyzing recent productivity behavior.2
The first paper examined the welfare-theoretic basis for measuring productivity growth and showed
that the ideal welfare-theoretic measure is a chain index of productivity growth rates of different
sectors which uses current output weights. It also laid out a technique for decomposing productivity
growth which separates aggregate productivity growth into three factors — a pure productivity effect,
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the effect of changing shares, and the effect of different productivity levels. Finally, it showed how
to apply the theoretically correct measure of productivity growth and indicated which of the three
different components should be included in a welfare-oriented measure of productivity growth. The
study concluded that none of the measures generally used to measure productivity growth are
consistent with the theoretically correct measure.
The purpose of the present paper, which is the second paper in the trilogy, is to describe and
present an analysis of productivity using new data from the national income and product accounts
(NIPA). It is highly data intensive and is essentially devoted to describing and deriving an
alternative data set for measuring productivity and productivity growth. The third paper in this
series, which is currently in draft, will apply the concepts in the first paper and the data in this second
paper to current issues in the measurement of productivity.
Because the present study is heavily methodological and data-intensive, we summarize the
approach and major results in this introductory section.
1. The present study introduces a new approach to measuring aggregate and industrial
productivity. It develops an income-side data base on productivity relying on data that are published
by the BEA. The data are internally consistent in that both inputs and outputs are income-side
measures of value added, whereas the usual productivity measures combine expenditure-side output
measures with income-side input measures. The advantage of the income-side measures is that they
present a consistent set of industrial accounts. The disadvantages are that they are only available for
the period 1977–98 and that they do not contain a set of capital accounts, so we can only examine
labor productivity.
2. Because of interest in the “new economy,” we have also constructed a set of new-economy
accounts. For the purpose of this study, we define the new economy as machinery, electric
equipment, telephone and telegraph, and software. These sectors grew from 3 percent of real GDP
in 1977 to 9 percent of real GDP in 1998. These sectors are somewhat more inclusive than a narrow
definition of the new economy but are the narrowest definition for which a complete set of accounts
is available.
3. This study considers three different output concepts which can be used in productivity
studies. One set is standard GDP (measured from the income side of the accounts). A second output
concept is what the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines as “business sector output.” A third
concept responds to concerns in productivity studies about the poor quality of the price deflation in
several sectors. For this purpose, we have constructed a set of accounts called “well-measured
output,” which includes only those sectors for which output is relatively well measured.
II. Data and Concepts
This study introduces a new data set that can be used for industrial and aggregate productivity
studies. While the underlying data come from the usual sources, the output data are value added and
are derived from income-side estimates. They are aggregated in a different fashion as well. This
section describes the approach used here.
The underlying data
This study relies upon the industry data prepared by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
details are thoroughly described in the background sources, but we will describe the major points
here. The major industries are shown in Table 1. The data for each industry include nominal output,
real output, and prices by industry. In all cases, the data are constructed as chain price and real output
indexes. Moreover, for each industry, the BEA calculates gross output, value added (or gross



product originating), and intermediate inputs (which equal gross output minus value added). In
addition, the BEA prepared series on compensation, employment, and hours worked for each major
industry.
The methodology for creating the different series will be briefly described.3 For the most part,
real output is never directly measured. Rather, the fundamental building blocks are measures of
nominal output and price indexes or deflators. Gross product originating (GPO) is calculated from
the income side of the accounts as the sum of factor incomes (wages, profits, etc). Gross output is
generally measured from the product (expenditure) side. As a result, intermediate inputs are the
difference between product-side gross output and income-side gross product originating.
Intermediate inputs therefore include not only the usual errors but also the statistical discrepancy
between income and product accounts.
Real output is calculated by deflating nominal output by price indexes. For the most part,
deflation takes place at the level of the five-digit SIC code. The BEA relies extensively on price
indexes prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for deflation. In a few cases, BEA uses
its own price deflators.
Definition of the “new economy”
This study also develops input and output data for the “new economy.” For purpose of this
study, I use the following formal definition of the new economy. The new economy involves
acquisition, processing and transformation, and distribution of information. The three major
components are the hardware (primarily computers) that processes the information, the
communications systems that acquire and distribute the information, and the software which, with
human help, manages the entire system.
Which sectors are included in practice under this definition? Table 2 shows the neweconomy sectors as defined by the Commerce Department for its study The Emerging Digital
Economy. The definition overlaps with that given in the last paragraph, although the Commerce
Department’s definition includes some old-economy sectors as well as some sectors with
questionable price indexes.
For purposes of this study, we are hamstrung because comprehensive data are limited to the
major industries shown in Table 1. We therefore include in the new economy those major industries
which contain the new-economy sectors, which is limited to four industries: Industrial machinery
and equipment (SIC 35), Electronic and other electric equipment (SIC 36), Telephone and telegraph,
and Prepackaged software. Table 3 shows the share of the new economy in real GDP. Clearly, the
new economy has become quantitatively important in recent years.
This definition of the new economy is somewhat broader than would be ideal for the present
purposes. For example, SIC 35 contains computers and office equipment, but the computer sector
comprises less than 25 percent of the total 1996 value added in that sector. Other parts of SIC 35
include ball bearings and heating and garden equipment, whose prices are probably not well
measured and which are dubious candidates for the new economy. SIC 36 contains prominently
semiconductors, which is central to the new economy, but semiconductors constitute only 8 percent
of the 1996 value added in SIC 36. This sector includes communications equipment, one part of
which has hedonic deflation. This sector also contains many old-economy industries, including
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incandescent bulbs, and a wide array of consumer electronics, whose prices are almost surely poorly
measured.
Similarly, while telephone and telegraph is central to the communications components of the
new economy, that sector includes some paleoindustries like telegraph, whose commercial
applications date from 1844, and telephone, which premiered in 1878.
Software is genuinely a new economy industry. However, only the prepackaged component
(slightly larger than one-third of the total) has hedonic deflation at present. As noted below, the data
on software are incomplete and some crude assumptions are necessary to fit that into the present data
base.
Because of the importance of the new economy in the present analysis, it is worth
emphasizing that relatively few industries use hedonic price indexes that systematically attempt to
capture new goods and components or quality change. The BEA reports that only four major
industries (all in new economy sectors) use systematic hedonic prices: computers and peripheral
equipment, semiconductors, prepackaged software, and digital switching equipment. As Table 4
shows, hedonic indexes are used in industries that comprise about 2.2 percent of GDP. We can
compare Tables 3 and 4 to get a rough idea of the extent to which the broad industry groups included
in the “new economy” sectors defined in Table 3 may overstate the narrower definition. In 1998,
the larger sectors were approximately 4 times larger than the narrow definition.
Adjustments of data for the present study
The industrial data prepared by BEA are the cornerstone for the present study. However,
some adjustments were necessary, particularly those needed to measure the impact of the new
economy.
1. Data on real output for 1977–98 are published only as index numbers. These are
converted into 1996 dollars by using 1996 dollar values for each industry.
2. Because of changes in the SIC definitions, BEA prepares data for the period up to 1987
based on the 1972 SIC codes, and for 1987–98 based on the 1987 SIC codes. For most industries,
the matches in levels for the two SIC codes were either exact or very close; that is, the measurements
of output using old and new definitions, which can be compared only for 1987, differed by less than
0.25 percent in most industries. Of the major (one-digit) industries, the redefinition of SIC codes
changed the 1987 values by less than 0.3 percent. Not surprisingly, some of the new-economy
sectors that we are dealing with in this study changed more dramatically. One two-digit industry
(electric and electronic equipment in the 1987 definition) had a major change in definition in 1987.
Because of changes in the definition, the dollar value of the industry was reduced by 13 percent. The
1987 value of telephone and telegraph was reduced by 3.3 percent, while machinery except electrical
was increased by 1.4 percent. For all data sets which did not match, the data were spliced together
at 1987.
3. For each of the four new-economy industries, some significant adjustments and
assumptions are necessary. We list the major ones here.
a. For industries 1, 2, and 3 in Table 4, BEA publishes data on all key variables except total
hours. The underlying unpublished data were provided by BEA. For hours and employment, as for
output, there were definitional changes for the industries in 1987. BEA provides estimates of
employment under the old and new SIC code definitions, and these match closely with the changes
in hours and output. We have therefore spliced the employment data using the ratio of employment
under the two definitions (this being the same technique as employed for real and nominal GDP).



For total hours, we have taken the ratio of total hours to persons engaged for each year; this ratio
changed relatively little around the year in which SIC definitions changed, 1987.
b. The change in SIC codes in 1987 led to a major redefinition for Electric and electronic
equipment. The redefinition in 1987 led to an decrease in nominal GPO by 13 percent. We have
spliced together the two different periods, but there remains a potential concern about whether the
behavior of the industry in the two periods was similar. This revision is probably unimportant for
the results of the present study because the share of Electric and electronic equipment was relatively
small before 1987 (0.57 percent of GDP in 1977 as compared to 2.61 percent in 1998).
c. The BEA does not publish complete industry estimates for software. The only publicly
distributed data are for real GPO and the chained price index for 1987–98, and nominal GPO for
1977–1998. A background paper by the BEA was the source of the estimates.4 For these purposes,
we have included only private production of software. Software is a very small component of
services and cannot be separated out as we can the other three new-economy sectors. To complete
the accounts for software, we assume that labor productivity is equal to aggregate labor productivity
plus the rate of decline in the output price relative to the overall output price (this is essentially the
same as assuming that the share of compensation in the two sectors move proportionally). We also
assume that hours in the software industry move proportionally with nominal GPD in that industry.
This assumes that the shares of compensation are the same in the two industries and that
compensation per worker in software is equal to the aggregate rate. There is no obvious way to
verify or improve on this assumption.
d. The BEA does not publish real GPO estimates for a few industries in the period before
1987 (although it does publish nominal GPO estimates). Presumably, this reflects the lack of price
indexes in the earlier period.5 To remedy this, we have assumed that the relative price movements
in the 1977–87 period were equal to the rate for the 1987–1990 period. This assumption was used
for the new economy sector, Electric and electronic equipment. It was also used for Instruments.
Note that this assumption is of only modest importance for the estimates of aggregate productivity
growth because the nominal output shares of these industries are relatively small in the period before
1987.
Construction of “BLS business sector output”
One of the most commonly followed measures of productivity is the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’s estimate of labor productivity. The most inclusive measure is what BLS defines as
“business sector output.” Business sector output is derived from the product side and consists of an
annual-weighted index constructed after excluding from gross domestic product the output and
inputs of general government, nonprofit institutions, paid employees of private households, and the
rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.6 We designate these as “BLS output” or “BLS data”
because these data are the ones used by BLS in their calculations of productivity. In reality, the data
are constructed and provided by BEA.
We have constructed an approximation of BLS business sector output from the income side
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as follows. We take income-side GDP and subtract private households, government, nonfarm
housing services, and an estimate of the share of nonprofit income in the major relevant services (75
percent of social services and membership organizations, 90 percent of educational services, 43
percent of health services, and 16 percent of amusement services.) 7
Figures 1 and 2 show the results of the construction. Figure 1 shows indexes of the BLS
index for the business sector along with the income-side estimate prepared for the present study.
Figure 2 shows the error in the estimate (equal to the ratio of the two minus one) along with the ratio
of the statistical discrepancy divided by business output. Table 5 shows a comparison of the
different series for three subperiods.
Two points are worth noting. First, the differences in growth rates in output are relatively
small for most of the period but have been extremely large in the most recent period. In the last
subperiod, 1996-98, BEA income-side business output (“BEA output”) is estimated to have grown
at 1.08 percentage points per year more rapidly than product-side business sector output (“BLS
output”). Second, recall that BEA output is measured from the income side, and that the statistical
discrepancy has moved sharply negative over the recent period. In part, it seems likely that the
difference between BLS output and BEA output measures reflects the fact that the statistical
discrepancy is included in the BEA output measure used here. Figure 2 shows the discrepancy
between the BLS and BEA output measures along with the normalized statistical discrepancy. The
year-to-year movements in the two series are clearly very close. In the last three years, however, note
that the difference between BLS and BEA measures of business real GDP is 2½ times the change
in the statistical discrepancy ratio.
“Well-measured output”
The final construct for the present study is the concept of “well-measured output.” It is
widely accepted today that in many sectors real output is poorly measured in the national economic
accounts. In some cases, such as general government, there is no serious attempt to measure output
and the indexes of activity are inputs such as employment. In other cases, the BEA (or the BLS,
which prepares the underlying price data) uses deflation techniques that are potentially defective.
The idea of well-measured v. poorly-measured sectors was introduced by Zvi Griliches in
his 1994 Presidential address:
Imagine a “degrees of measurability” scale, with wheat production at one end and
lawyer services at the other. One can draw a rough dividing line on this scale
between what I shall call “reasonably measurable” sectors and the rest, where the
situation is not much better today than it was at the beginning of the national income
accounts.8
Defective deflation occurs for two quite different reasons. In one case, for which
construction or banking might be good examples, BEA does use price indexes for deflation of
nominal magnitudes, but the prices indexes are for goods or services which may not be
representative of the range of outputs in that sector. A second reason, which has received much
more attention, is that the underlying price index may not adequately capture quality change or new
7
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goods and services. An excellent historical example of this syndrome is computers. Before hedonic
techniques were introduced, the government assumed that the price of computers was constant in
nominal terms. When hedonics were introduced, this assumption was found to overstate the “true”
price increase by around 20 percent per year for the last two decades.
It is difficult for an outsider to assess the quality of the deflation of each sector included in
the industrial accounts. There are many studies of this issue.9 Nonetheless, after discussion with
experts inside and outside of BEA, we have constructed a new measure of output for sectors that
have relatively well-measured outputs.10 The sectors included in well-measured output are:
1. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing
2. Mining
3. Manufacturing
4. Transportation and public utilities
5. Wholesale trade
6. Retail trade
These sectors are composed largely of well-defined and relatively simple goods or services.
There are undoubtedly areas in the well-measured sector for which quality change is not adequately
captured (such as scientific instruments, consumer electronics, automobiles, communications
equipment, or e-commerce), but for the most part it seems likely that the statistical system can
identify the commodities sufficiently well so that the proper items are priced.
There are four major sectors that are excluded from well-measured output. We list those
below with a brief annotation about the reasons for their omission.
7. Construction is omitted because of the well-established problems of finding good price
indexes for various components. The Boskin Commission identified numerous difficulties in
measuring the quality of the housing stock and argued for a 0.25 percent per year upward bias in the
price index for housing.11
8. Finance, insurance, and real estate are excluded for two different reasons. First, real estate
is largely capital income and can substantially bias the estimate of labor productivity. In addition,
there are severe difficulties in measuring output in this sector. A substantial part of the output of the
financial sector is imputed income from banking services, which has only recently used output
measures for deflation. Composite indexes of input data are used to deflate life insurance and the
bulk of investment in nonresidential structures.
9. Services is a mixed bag, with some services probably pretty well measured (haircuts),
while others are moderately defective (health), to others which are largely input based (private
households). One of the major difficulties is that many services (such as education and health care)
are extremely complex commodities whose output defies routine measurement. Slifman and
Corrado found negative trends in labor productivity in most service industries and argue that price
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measurement error is the “likely statistical explanation for the implausible productivity.” 12
10. Government is omitted because deflation is largely input based.
This separation into well-measured and not-so-well-measured sectors is quite tentative and
might be refined by moving to the two-digit level. That step would require further research by
experts into the details of deflation in the different sectors.
Figures 3 and 4 compare the three concepts in terms of their trends and shares of GDP. Both
business sector output and well-measured sectors were relatively stable shares of GDP until the early
1990s, but have since then increased their shares of total output.
III. Preliminary Estimates of Productivity Trends
The question of productivity trends will be discussed in the third companion paper to this
one, but it will be useful to present some data on productivity to gauge the credibility of the data and
show some tentative findings.
We begin with a comparison between the labor productivity in the business sector using the
BEA (income-side) and BLS (output-side) approaches. We have discussed the numerator (real value
added) above. Both the BEA and the BLS rely on BLS data on employment and hours, but the
concepts and definitions are slightly different.
Figures 5 and 6 and Table 6 show a comparison of estimates of productivity growth using
the BEA (income-side) and BLS (output-side) approaches. There are substantial discrepancies
between the productivity estimates of the two sources. The BLS output-side series yields higher
productivity growth rate numbers in the early period, but in the most recent period the BEA income
side estimates are 0.56 percentage per year more rapid. The difference between the two estimates
comes both from the output and the hours data. BEA output is estimated to have grown about 1
percentage point faster in the last 3 years, while hours are estimated to have grown about 0.5 percent
more rapidly.
Figure 7 and Table 7 show the results by comparing productivity growth for the three
different concepts: total GDP from the income side, business sector, and well-measured output. Two
conclusions are readily apparent. First, productivity growth for the well-measured sectors is about
twice that in the business sector or for total GDP. Second, for the last three years of the period,
productivity growth in the well-measured sectors has been impressive, averaging more than 4½
percent per year in 1996–98. Third, there was a sharp productivity acceleration in the late 1990s,
with productivity growth in the well-measured sectors rising more than 2 percentage points above
the earlier period.
It would be interesting to know whether the most recent data for the well-measured sectors
return productivity growth in that sector back to the pre-1973 rate. We do not have complete date
for the period before 1977.13 We can, however, use Griliches’s estimates from his study of
“measurable” sectors, although these are conceptually different from current estimates. The
Griliches measurable sectors had a rate of labor productivity growth of slightly below 3 percent per
year for the 1948–73 and 1948–77 periods, so it seems likely that productivity in the well-measured
sectors is actually above that in the “golden age” from 1948 until 1973.
12
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We next present new data on productivity growth by industry in Tables 8 through 10. These
show gross product originating per hour worked by industry for major manufacturing industries.
(Current labor productivity measures prepared by BLS are generally total output per hour worked.)
While the series are somewhat noisy, they show a reasonable trend for most industries. Figure 10
shows two problem children, petroleum and tobacco, which have wild productivity growth estimates.
This deviant behavior is caused by very low shares of labor in petroleum, and by high indirect taxes
for tobacco. This behavior is a warning that productivity measures which do not allow for strange
behavior in some industries may give misleading results.
Finally, Figure 11 shows estimates of productivity growth in the new economy as a whole
as well as in its four sectors. The major conclusion is that productivity in the new economy has been
extremely impressive in the last few years, rising from around 5 percent per year in the early 1990s
to over 10 percent per year in the late 1990s. The results for the period before 1990 are relatively
noisy and probably reflect poor underlying data.
To summarize, the present study presents new data on measuring output and labor
productivity, concentrating on the income side of the national accounts. The data show somewhat
larger output and productivity growth in recent years, and confirm the impressive growth in the new
economy sectors.
The next paper in this series will apply the theoretical concepts derived in the first paper as
well as the data presented in the present paper to examine current hypotheses about productivity and
estimate the contribution of the new economy to the recent productivity rebound. It will also present
a new measure of labor productivity growth which applies the data derived in this paper to the new
welfare-theoretic measure derived in the first paper in this series.



Table 1
Major Industries for BEA Industrial Output and Input Data
Gross domestic product
Private industries
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing
Farms
Agricultural services, forestry, and fishing
Mining
Metal mining
Coal mining
Oil and gas extraction
Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels
Construction
Manufacturing
Durable goods
Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Stone, clay, and glass products
Primary metal industries
Fabricated metal products
Industrial machinery and equipment
Electronic and other electric equipment
Motor vehicles and equipment
Other transportation equipment
Instruments and related products
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
Nondurable goods
Food and kindred products
Tobacco products
Textile mill products
Apparel and other textile products
Paper and allied products
Printing and publishing
Chemicals and allied products
Petroleum and coal products
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products
Leather and leather products
Transportation and public utilities
Transportation
Railroad transportation
Local and interurban passenger transit
Trucking and warehousing
Water transportation
Transportation by air
Pipelines, except natural gas
Transportation services
Communications
Telephone and telegraph
Radio and television
Electric, gas, and sanitary services



Table 1 (cont.)
Major Industries for BEA Industrial Output and Input Data

Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Depository institutions
Nondepository institutions
Security and commodity brokers
Insurance carriers
Insurance agents, brokers, and service
Real estate
Nonfarm housing services
Other real estate
Holding and other investment offices
Services
Hotels and other lodging places
Personal services
Business services
Auto repair, services, and parking
Miscellaneous repair services
Motion pictures
Amusement and recreation services
Health services
Legal services
Educational services
Social services
Membership organizations
Other services
Private households
Government
Federal
General government
Government enterprises
State and local
General government
Government enterprises



Table 2
Commerce Department Definition of Digital Economy
Information Technology Industries:
Share of the Economy and Contribution to Economic Growth

Industry
Total Gross Domestic Product (GDP)*
Hardware
Computers & equipment
Computers & equipment wholesale sales
Computers & equipment retail sales
Calculating & office maachines, nec.
Electron Tubes
Printed circuit boards
Semiconductors
Passive electronic components
Industrial instruments for measurement
Instruments for measuring electricity
Laboratory analytical instruments
Total Hardware
Software/Services
Computer pprogramming services
Prepackaged software
Prepackaged software wholesale sales
Prepackaged software retail sales
Computer integrated systems design
Computer processing & data preparation
Information retrieval services
Computer services management
Computer rental and leasing
Computer maintenance and repair
Computer related services, nec
Total software and services
Communications
Household audio & video equipment
Telephone & telegraph equipment
Radio & TV & communications equipment
Magnetic & optical recording media
Total Communications Hardware
Telephone and telegraph communications
Radio broadcasting
Television broadcasting
Cable and other pay TV services
Total Communications Services

SIC

1995
1998
[Value added; $millions except as note
7,293,600
8,461,644

3571,2,5,7
5045 [part]
5734 [part]
3578.9
3671
3672
3674
3675-9
3823
3825
3826

32,931.2
50,756.0
2,513.8
3,036.2
1,472.9
5,718.5
51,272.0
19,097.6
4,998.5
7,512.3
4,270.6
183,579.6

45,081.8
74,173.3
3,441.3
3,478.1
1,716.8
7,602.8
70,092.2
29,801.9
5,546.9
8,399.0
4,780.9
254,115.0

7371
7372
5045 [part]
5734 [part]
7373
7374
7375
7376
7377
7378
7379
7371-9

26,178.3
19,971.7
2,564.0
126.1
15,025.1
17,924.5
3,768.5
2,135.2
1,329.0
5,023.7
8,549.1
102,595.2

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
151,999.3

3651
3661
3663
3695

2,343.0
14,925.2
19,862.0
2,787.8
39,918.0

2,767.6
17,373.7
27,854.3
3,293.0
51,288.6

481,22, 99
4832
4833
4841

144,100.0
6,149.6
17,102.7
24,247.7
191,600.0

163,674.4
8,695.8
20,975.6
31,838.3
225,184.0

517,692.8
7.1%

682,586.9
8.1%

Total All Information Technology Industries
Share of the Economy (%)
Source: U.S. Commerce Department, The Emerging Digital Economy



Table 3
Share of New Economy in Real GDP

Gross product originating, billions, 1996 prices
1978

1987

1998

45
25
66
13

73
54
103
39

194
222
209
157

148

269

782

3.1%

4.4%

9.1%

New Economy Sectors
1
2
3
4

Machinery, except electrical
Electric and electronic equipment
Telephone and telegraph
Software
Total, new economy sectors
Item: Total as % of real GDP

Source: GDPTab: revised industry 110300.wb3



Table 4
Important Industries That Use Hedonic Price Indexes
to Deflate Nominal Output
1998 Value added
or GPO (billions)

Industry

Percent of
GDP 1998

Computers and equipment, wholesale sales (a)
Semiconductors
Prepackaged software
Telephone and telegraph equipment (b)

$ 74
70
35
17

0.8%
0.8
0.4
0.2

Total, major industries with
hedonic adjustment to prices

$196

2.2%

(a) Some components of this sector may not use hedonic pricing.
(b) Note that only digital switching equipment uses hedonic pricing. The share of this is not published.



Figure 1
Comparison of Business Sector Output:
BLS and BEA Constructed
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BEA (income)

Business Output (1992 = 100)

130
120
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70
60
1975
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Note: “BLS” is the output-side product of the business sector used by BLS in its business sector productivity
measures. “BEA” is the income-side output measure as derived in this paper.
Source: Tables: revised industry 110300.wb3



Figure 2

Output and Statistical Discrepancy:
Comparison BEA and BLS Output

Error or Statistical Discrepancy

0.02
0.01
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
-0.03
(BEA / BLS) -1

-0.04

Stat disc/BEA income

1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998

Note: “BEA/BLS -1“ is the ratio of BEA to BLS business sector output minus one. “Stat disc/BEA income”
is the ratio of the statistical discrepancy to BEA income-side GDP. “BLS” is the output-side product of the
business sector used by BLS in its business sector productivity measures. “BEA” is the income-side output
measure as derived in this paper.



Table 5
Comparison of BEA and BLS Measures of Business Sector Output

1978-89

1990-95

1996-98

3.45%
3.45%
-0.01%

2.50%
2.40%
0.10%

4.89%
5.96%
-1.08%

Change in ratio of statistical discrepancy
-0.09%
to BEA output

0.01%

-0.40%

Growth rates
BLS
BEA
Difference

Note: “BLS” is the output-side product of the business sector used by BLS in its business sector productivity
measures. “BEA” is the income-side output measure as derived in this paper.



Figure 3

Three Output Concepts:
GDP, Business, Well-Measured Output

Real output (billions of 1996 dollars)
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GDP

1,000
1975

1980

Business sector

1985

Source: WMOut: revised industry 110300.wb3



1990

Well-measured

1995

2000

Figure 4

Share of Total Output:
Business Sector and Well-Measured
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Percent of Real GDP
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40%
Business sector

30%
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Source: WMOut: revised industry 110300.wb3
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Table 6
Comparison of BEA and BLS Measures
of Labor Productivity Growth in the Business Sector Output

Business Sector
[1]
1978-89
Output of Business Sector
BEA
BLS

[2]
1990-95

[3]
1996-98

Change from earlier period
[2] - [1]
[3] - [1]

1.27%

1.26%

3.16%

-0.01%

1.89%

1.37%

1.49%

2.50%

0.12%

1.13%

Source: BusSec: revised industry 110300.wb3
Note: “BLS” is the output-side product of the business sector used by BLS in its business sector productivity
measures. “BEA” is the income-side output measure as derived in this paper.



Figure 5

Comparison of Productivity Growth:
BEA v. BLS Business Sector

Growth in Labor Productivity (% p.y.)

3.5%
3.0%
2.5%

BLS
BEA

2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%

1978-89

1990-95

1996-98

Note: “BLS” is the output-side product of the business sector used by BLS in its business sector productivity
measures. “BEA” is the income-side output measure as derived in this paper.



Figure 6

Productivity Growth: BEA v. BLS
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Productivity growth (% per year)
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Note: “BLS” is the output-side product of the business sector used by BLS in its business sector productivity
measures. “BEA” is the income-side output measure as derived in this paper.



Figure 7
Growth in Labor Productivity in Different Sectoral Definition

5.0%

Average growth in labor productivity

1978-89

4.0%
1990-95

3.0%

1996-98

2.0%

1.0%

0.0%

GDP (income)

Bus Sect

Note: “GDP (income)” is total GDP measured from the product side.
“Bus Sect” is the income-side measure of business output.
“WM output” is well-measured output as defined in text.
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Table 7
Labor Productivity Growth
Alternative Concepts and Periods

1978-89
Sector

[1]

1990-95
[2]

1996-98
[3]

Change from earlier period
[2] - [1]

[3] - [1]

Total GDP (income side)

1.15%

0.95%

2.34%

-0.21%

1.18%

Business output

1.37%

1.27%

3.19%

-0.10%

1.82%

Well-measured business output

2.39%

2.24%

4.49%

-0.16%

2.09%

New economy

6.53%

7.31%

13.30%

0.78%

6.77%



Figure 8
Productivity Growth in Major Durable Manufacturing Industries
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Figure 9
Productivity Growth in Major Nondurable Manufacturing Industries
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Figure 10
Problem Children: Petroleum and Tobacco
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Source: ProdManu: revised industry 110300.wb3
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Figure 11
Productivity Growth in New Economy Sectors
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Source: ProdManu: revised industry 110300.wb3
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